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COMMENTS
RISK OF LOSS AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
THE UNLAMENTED PASSING OF PASSING OF TITLE
In a simple economy, it might take little more than an instant to transfer
rights to ownership of personal property: one man meets another at the mar-
ket and, without prior arrangement, exchanges his horse for the other's hawk
and robe. Contemporary sales transactions, however, may begin with adver-
tising, wind through negotiation, contract, storage, shipment, bills of lading,
bank drafts, and delivery, and end with provisions for extended credit. Much
modern sales law arises from the practice of businessmen of dealing with com-
plex transactions as spur-of-the-moment barters; rarely does the commercial
contract provide adequately for the incidents of the modern transaction.
"Business men habitually adventure large sums of money on contracts which,
for the purpose of defining legal obligations, are a mere jumble of words.
They trust to luck or the good faith of the opposite party, with the comfortable
assurance that any adverse result of litigation may be attributed to the hair-
splitting of lawyers... ."' Accordingly, there developed a system of legal rules
to apportion rights and burdens between buyers and sellers of chattels: this
comment will discuss the resulting allocation of the risk of the chattel's destruc-
tion by outside causes.2
The common law solved or, more accurately, summarized its solutions to
most sales problems by the concept of title.8 Title passed at some point in the
transaction, theoretically when intended by the parties.' This rule was codified
in section 18 of the Uniform Sales Act:' "Where there is a contract to sell
specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer
at such time as the parties to the contract intend. . . ." However, it is difficult
for laymen to form intelligible intentions with regard to a technical legal con-
cept. Indeed, when even Learned Hand admittedly failed to understand title,'
it seems ludicrous to base important legal relations on lay understanding, or
even on lawyers' opinion.7
To overcome the absence of intention by the parties, the law provides rules
to fix the passing of title. Thus section 19 of the Uniform Sales Act provides
five rules, deceptively termed "Rules for ascertaining intention." In fact, there
'Phoenix Ins. Co. v. De Monchy, 141 L.T.R. (n.s.) 439, 445 (H.L. 1929).
'The rules with regard to realty are different both in conception and result. See, e.g., Torlucmke v.
Abernathey, 174 Kan. 668, 258 P.2d 282 (1953), 2 KAN. L. Rav. 301 (1954). "These variant conclusions
are not dictated by variant considerations of policy or justice." CARtozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 39 (1921).
"The words "property" and "title" were given slightly different technical meanings, but that dis-
tinction "need not trouble the modern lawyer." BRAUCHER & SUTHERLAND, COMMERCIAL TRANsACTIoNs 145(1964). No distinction will be made in this comment, following the practice of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
' "It is unquestionably true that the intent of the parties controls . Bailey v. Long, 24 Kan. 90,
95 (1880).
'The act was not adopted in Kansas.
'" '[T)itle' is a formal word for a purely conceptual notion; I do not know what it means and I
question whether anybody does, except perhaps legal historians." In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326,
328-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 622 (1935).
' "Now when the location of 'the property' in the wares thus gets far enough away from homely fact
to need a lawyer to decide about it, but is supposed to be determined by the intentions of parties who are
not lawyers, that is not so good. And when the lawyers themselves have difficulty in doing the deciding,
that is worse." Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARv. L. Rav. 725, 733 (1939).
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is usually no intention to ascertain; the rules would be better titled "substitutes
for intention." In substance, the rules provide that title passes: (1) when the
contract is made, if the goods are specific and deliverable;' (2) when the seller
makes them deliverable, if they are specific but not deliverable;' (3) when
delivered if sold on "sale or return," but only when accepted if sold "on ap-
proval;"'" (4) when "unconditionally appropriated" to the contract, if the
goods were not originally specified; (5) when delivered at destination, if the
contract called for the seller either to pay freight or to deliver to some place
specified by the buyer.1' These rules are believed to express the common law.'2
Once the location of the title is unearthed, the problem of determining who
suffers the loss of the goods, if they are destroyed, is simple. The general rule
is that the loss of the goods falls upon the person who has "title," that is, upon
the person whose goods they are:13 res perit domino. There are only three ex-
ceptions: (a) where the parties have made specific agreement for the risk of
loss; 4 (b) where title is retained by the seller for security only;'5 and (c)
where the loss occurs because of some delay. 6
The Uniform Commercial Code, however, has removed the concept of title
from the analytic center of sales problems; legal relations are instead made to
depend "on the vitally important factors and not on the undefined and inopera-
tive concepts."' 7 It is, however, still necessary to consider title in two broad
contexts: (1) for purposes outside the law of sales-mainly criminal law,'8
taxation,'9 and public regulation;20 and (2) where the final question is owner-
ship, and not merely some incident of the sale.2 Thus section 2-401 establishes
'Accord, Kingman v. Holmquist, 36 Kan. 735, 14 Pac. 168 (1887).
* Accord, Stewart v. Henningsen Produce Co., 88 Kan. 521, 129 Pac. 181 (1913).
"Accord, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Comm'n of Revenue & Taxation, 156 Kan. 408, 133 P.2d
1008 (1943).
"Accord, Hunter Bros. Milling Co. v. Kramer Bros., 71 Kan. 468, 80 Pac. 963 (1905) (f.o.b. buyer's
city).
2 See, e.g., Levinson v. Connors, 269 Mass. 209 ...... 168 N.E. 736, 737 (1929) (rule 1); Cassinelli v.
Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208 .... , 183 Pac. 523, 525 (1919) (rule 5).
"s UNIFORM SALES ACT § 22.
"UNIFORM SALES ACT § 22. On one hand, an agreement allocating risk was taken to show that title
was in the person assuming the risk, Martineau v. Kitching, L.R. 7 Q.B. 436 (1872); on the other, a
special agreement was thought to show that title must be in the other party, Elgee Cotton Cases, 89 U.S.
(22 Wall.) 180 (1874); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Comm'n of Revenue & Taxation, 156 Kan. 408,
133 P.2d 1008 (1943).
'
5
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 22(a); UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT S 27.
"The person responsible for the delay assumes the risk. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 22(b); Wing v.
Mid-Continent Seeds, Inc., 170 Kan. 242, 225 P.2d 78 (1950); Schenning v. Devere & Schloegel Lumber
Co., 173 Wis. 20, 180 N.W. 136 (1920).
'
7 Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted? 59 YALE L.J. 821, 827 (1950).
'B At common law, if title passes in a fraudulent transaction, the crime is false pretenses; if not, the
crime is larceny by trick. Murchinson v. State, 30 Ala. App. 15, 199 So. 897 (1940).
'B An excellent illustrative case is Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Comm'n of Revenue & Taxation,
156 Kan. 408, 133 P.2d 1008 (1943), where the question was whether goods shipped from a depot in
Missouri to Kansas were subject to Kansas sales tax. The court construed the deals to be sales on approval;
accordingly, title passed only on acceptance (in Kansas), and therefore the goods were taxed. Possibly a
more satisfactory course is to decide tax questions on some other basis altogether, as in Undercofler v.
United States Steel Corp., 109 Ga. App. 8, 135 S.E.2d 69 (1964).
' Under a statute licensing the sale of liquor, the seller must be licensed where title passes, usually
where he delivers to the carrier. Williams v. Feiniman, 14 Kan. 288 (1875); Haug v. Gillett, 14 Kan.
140 (1875).
'"[T]here are problems in which the ultimate, as opposed to the intermediate, question is one of
title .. " ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401:2 (1961).
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rules for passing of title,2 where material, 3 but specifically provides that "each
provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies of
the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of
title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title."
The question of risk of loss is considered separately, primarily in sections
2-509 and 2-510. The propriety of that separation has been challenged by Pro-
fessor Williston: "As Maitland wrote, the law is a 'seamless web.' The most
fundamental feature of the law of property [the concept of title] cannot be
made immaterial in a statute on the sale of goods without tearing the seamless
web."24 Respect limits comment to the observation that the modern lawyer is,
perhaps, not distraught by seams. The theory of the code has been, in any case,
amply defended. 5
RISK IN THE ABSENCE OF BREACH
The basic provisions controlling risk of loss in the absence of breach are
found in section 2-509, which is divided into four subsections. The subsections
will be discussed in order.
Delivery by Carrier
(1) Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier
(a) if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, the
risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are delivered to the carrier
even though the shipment is under reservation (Section 2-505); but
(b) if it does require him to deliver them at a particular destination and the
goods are there duly tendered while in the possession of the carrier, the
risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are there duly so tendered
as to enable the buyer to take delivery.
This subsection does not change the result reached under prior law. The
Sales Act's provisions with regard to title are similar in effect.26 Several Kansas
cases have held that title ordinarily passes on delivery to the carrier; 7 but, as
in the code, in a case where the contract called for delivery in the buyer's city,
the destruction of the goods fell upon the seller.28
Several other provisions of the code, unfortunately not indicated by cross-
reference, may be relevant. If a contract contains a term for delivery "ex ship"
or equivalent language, "the risk of loss does not pass to the buyer until the
goods leave the ship's tackle or are otherwise properly unloaded."29 If the sale
is "F.O.B. place of shipment," risk passes on delivery to the carrier; if "F.O.B.
destination," risk passes on tender of delivery at the destination; and if "F.O.B.
' Some disparity with the Kansas cases may be explained by the narrowness of the issue under the
code. KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: KANSAS ANNOTATIONS 71 (1964).
The code is not intended to determine when questions of title become material in other areas. UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401, comment 1.
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 569
(1950). See generally Cudahy, Samuel Williston: the Uniform Commercial Code and the Prior Law of
Sales-Seamless or Tangled Web, 46 MARQ. L. REV. 451 (1963).
SE.g., Corbin, supra note 17.
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 19, Rules 4(2) and 5.
Williams v. Feiniman, 14 Kan. 288 (1875); Haug v. Gillett, 14 Kan. 140 (1875).
'sHunter Bros. Milling Co. v. Kramer Bros., 71 Kan. 468, 80 Pac. 963 (1905).
SUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-322(2)(b).
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cars, vessel," etc., risk passes when the goods are loaded.3 If the contract pro-
vides for delivery "F.A.S. vessel" (free along side), risk passes when the goods
are delivered alongside a vessel, or at a dock designated by the buyer.3'
One term which is unclearly defined in its effect on risk of loss is "C.I.F."
(cost, insurance, and freight)32 Section 2-320(2) provides "C.I.F. destination
or its equivalent requires the seller at his own expense and risk to ... (b) load
the goods and obtain a receipt from the carrier." Thus it would seem that the
risk of loss remains the seller's beyond delivery to the carrier, until the goods
are actually loaded. Yet the Official Comment to this section states, "Delivery
to the carrier is delivery to the buyer for purposes of risk and 'tide.'" And
risk of loss would clearly pass to the buyer on his receipt of the goods.33 No
cases in point at common law 4 or under the Uniform Sales Act 3 have been
found. The text of the statute, rather than the comment, is supported by occa-
sional judicial language, as in the leading case of Crozier, Stephens & Co. v.
Auerbach, where title under C.I.F. terms was said to pass "at the moment of
delivery on board.""6 The comment, however, raises the possibility that the
Commissioners did not say exactly what they intended. The disparity, in any
case, is unlikely to cause practical difficulty, especially in Kansas3 7
Goods Held by Bailee
(2) Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved, the
risk of loss passes to the buyer
(a) on his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering the goods; or
(b) on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of the
goods; or
(c) after his receipt of a non-negotiable document of title or other written
direction to deliver, as provided in subsection (4)(b) of section 2-503.
The difference between (a) and (c) should be noted. If the goods are
transferred by a negotiable 3 document of title, risk passes on receipt; if the
document is not negotiable, risk passes after receipt. In the case of a non-
negotiable document, risk of loss remains on the seller until the buyer has had
a reasonable time to present the document, and continues on the seller if the
bailee refuses to honor the document. 9
This rule with regard to non-negotiable documents seems reasonable: risk
follows physical ability to control. In the case of negotiable documents, how-
ever, the documents are not commercially considered merely as the right to
receive wheat; they are used as a medium of exchange and a store of value, and
may pass through many hands on their way to the user. Accordingly, it seems
'0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-319(1). These provisions, of course, simply clarify the meaning of
F.O.B. provisions, and in no way change the basic rules of section 2-509.
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-319(2).
'Note also that "C.&F." (cost and freight) has the same effect for purposes of risk. UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 5 2-320(3).
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 5-209(3).
See 2 WILLISrON, SALES § 280c (rev. ed. 1948).
The Sales Act, however, had no specific provisions with regard to "C.I.F." terms; any problems were
resolved by the general provisions of section 19. CI. Obrecht v. Crawford, 175 Md. 385, 2 A.2d 1 (1938).
[1908] 2 K.B. 161, 165 (italics added). But ci. The Hans Maersk, 266 Fed. 806 (2d Cir. 1920).
"C.I.F. and C.&F. terms are used primarily in overseas contracts.
Defined in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 7-104.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-503(4)(b).
[Vol. 13
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proper not to retain the risk on the transferor pending the transferee's oppor-
tunity to obtain possession, since the transferee seldom has any interest in
obtaining the goods.
There are no Kansas cases directly in point. The provisions with regard to
negotiable documents of title do not alter the basic provisions of the Sales Act.4°
In the case of non-negotiable documents, however, the Sales Act provides
that title is not transferred until the bailee acknowledges the buyer's right to
possession.4' Under the code, risk would remain on the seller only for a
reasonable period.
Other Sales
(3) In any case not within subsection (1) or (2), the risk of loss passes to the buyer
on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk passes
to the buyer on tender of delivery.
This section unquestionably differs from the prior law, generally and in
Kansas. Under the Sales Act,42 title (and thus risk) might in some cases pass
when the contract was made,43 or in others when the seller made the goods
deliverable.44 If the goods were sold by description, title passed when either
party "appropriated" the goods to the contract.4 5 In all these cases, although
"tide" might pass under section 2-401, the code would change the law and the
risk would remain on the merchant seller until delivery, on other sellers until
tender.
In the Kansas cases, as in cases under the Sales Act, there are instances in
which the buyer has been held liable for the price of goods destroyed before
the seller's delivery. In one case, the seller, under contract F.O.B. place of
shipment, separated a specified number of egg yolks and placed them in cold
storage with a bailee to be ordered by the buyer. Due to failure of refrigeration,
the yolks were destroyed. The court, construing the contract as a matter of
law, apparently had little difficulty with the F.O.B. term, and held that title
passed when the contract came to relate to specific goods (appropriation)."'
In another case the Kansas Court of Appeals declared, accurately, that "the rule
is, in sales of personal property, that the title passes at once on the sale, if such
is the intention of the parties, though the seller is afterward to make a delivery
of the goods sold."4 7 It would ordinarily be assumed that such was the inten-
tion of the parties.48
The distinction between merchant and non-merchant is one drawn through-
out the code.49 A merchant is defined as one "who deals in goods of the kind
or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved... ."'0 The theory behind making
'o Compare Marshall Milling Co. v. Rosenbluth, 231 Ill. App. 325 (1924).
UNIFORMS SAL.Es ACT 5 43(3).
UNIFORM SALES Acr S 19.
If nothing is said with' regard to delivery or title, title to specific and deliverable goods passes at
once. E.g., Casinelli v. Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523 (1919).
"E.g., Boiko v. Atlantic Woolen Mills, Inc., 195 App. Div. 207, 186 N.Y. Supp. 624 (1921).
'E.g., Henry Glass & Co. v. Misroch, 239 N.Y. 475, 147 N.E. 71 (1925).
Stewart v. Henningsen Produce Co., 88 Kan. 521, 129 Pac. 181 (1913).
Kneeland v. Renner, 2 Kan. App. 451, 454, 43 Pac. 95, 96 (1896).
"E.g., Harris v. Merlino, 137 N.J.L. 717, 61 A.2d 276 (1948).
"Jones, Back to Contract?, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 143.
'UNIFoRMd COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104(1).
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the merchant bear the risk of loss until he delivers is based on reasonable
expectations of insurance:51 for example, the consumer who buys a television
set ordinarily would not increase his insurance coverage until he actually re-
ceives the set. The merchant, on the other hand, may carry insurance on his
inventory, or regularly plan to absorb his own losses, and would not ordinarily
lower his coverage after each sale. Additionally, it seems proper to hold the
merchant liable while the goods are in his physical possession, since he holds
himself out as an expert and ought best to be able to preserve them. The
difference between the delivery required of the merchant and the tender52
required of others becomes relevant primarily where the buyer breaches his
contract and refuses to accept the tender; problems of breach are discussed in
the next section.
Contrary Agreement
(4) The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement of the parties
and to the provisions of this article on sale on approval (Section 2-327) and on
effect of breach on risk of loss (Section 2-510).
Ostensibly, the provision that the allocation of risk may be varied by agree-
ment merely repeats the Sales Act's principle that risk follows title, "unless
otherwise agreed.""3 The passing of title itself, however, could be adjusted by
the parties without agreement, by mere intention. 4
The result of basing title on intention is uncertainty and inconsistency. For
example, contracts for the sale of standing crops are usually held not to pass
title, because the seller has not completed his performance by making them
deliverable. 5 In a similar case, however, there was a contract to sell 1200
bushels, "more or less," of cut corn: the seller was to shell, measure, package,
and deliver the corn; two thirds of the price had been paid "on account." The
court held that title passed, relying upon a jury's response to an instruction
in highly technical language about the parties' intentions. 6
Another uncertainty might arise from the construction of a transaction as
a cash sale, that is, one in which the parties intended title to pass only upon
payment. Unfortunately, one construction or the other seems equally likely
to be chosen by the court."7 Hopefully, these uncertainties will not influence
the allocation of risk of loss under the code; it will be necessary to show
some actual agreement, at some place and time, in order to argue successfully
that the general rules should not govern. No longer, hopefully, will juries be
asked to determine intention by arcane instructions in terms of "rights to
ownership."
An interesting case, decided under the code, found an agreement to allocate
risk. A buyer received a machine on approval, expressly promising to return
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-509, comment 3.
"Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposition
and give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery." UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-503(1).
'UNIFORM SALES ACT § 22.
5' UNIFORM SALES ACT 18.
rHughes & Zeek v. Wiley, 36 Kan. 731, 14 Pac. 269 (1887); Bailey v. Long, 24 Kan. 90 (1880);
Kneeland v. Renner, 2 Kan. App. 451, 43 Pac. 95 (1896).
r Barber v. Thomas, 66 Kan. 463, 71 Pac. 845 (1903).
Compare Winter v. Miller, 183 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1950) with Harbert v. Fort Smith Canning Co.,
134 Kan. 240, 5 P.2d 849 (1931).
[Vol. 13
COMMENTS
it in the same condition; he was held liable for its destruction by fire." Absent
special agreement, one who buys on approval does not bear the risk until ac-
ceptance, whereas with a sale "or return," risk is on the buyer until he returns
it successfully. 9
RISK IN CASE OF BREACH
Section 2-5 10. Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss.(1) Where a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the contract as to
give a right of rejection the risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure
or acceptance.
(2) Where the buyer rightfully revokes acceptance he may to the extent of any
deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat the risk of loss as having
rested on the seller from the beginning.
(3) Where the buyer as to conforming goods already identified to the contract for
sale repudiates or is otherwise in breach before risk of their loss has passed to
him, the seller may to the extent of any deficiency in his effective insurance
coverage treat the risk of loss as resting on the buyer for a commercially rea-
sonable time.
Section 2-510, the basic section on the effect of breach on risk of loss, does
not change the prior rules in the case of the seller's breach by tender or delivery
of non-conforming goods; risk remains on the seller until he cures6" the defect
or until the buyer accepts. It should be noted that where the seller delivers
defective goods, and "cures" his tender by a new delivery, the buyer's liabili-
ties are for the conforming goods, not the original shipment. If, however, the
seller cures his tender by repairing the goods, the buyer will assume the risk
of those goods' destruction.
The novel features of section 2-510 are its provisions in case of the buyer's
rightful revocation or his breach before the passing of risk to him. The buyer
may rightfully revoke where he has accepted non-conforming goods without
reasonable opportunity to discover the defect, or where his acceptance was in-
duced either by the seller's assurances of the conformity of the goods, or by the
reasonable assumption that the defect would be cured.61 In such a case, section
2-510 requires the buyer to bear the risk to the extent of his insurance (and the
insurer will have no subrogation rights); any losses he is unable to recover
from insurance may be passed to the seller.
If the buyer breaches the contract before risk passes to him, and the goods
are destroyed, the seller may collect any deficiency in his insurance from the
buyer. This right of the seller, however, exists only for a commercially reason-
able time; the time limitation is said to be to enable him to obtain additional
insurance,62 but may also encompass resale of the goods.
This section is thus different, both in theory and in result, from the com-
mon law and the Sales Act. The traditional law did not contemplate splitting
the risk by operation of law. In case of breach there were two principles which
' Industron Corp. v. Waltham Door & Window Co., 346 Mass. 18, 190 N.E.2d 211 (1963).
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-327. Accord, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Comm'n of Revenue
& Taxation, 156 Kan. 408, 133 P.2d 1008 (1943).
" See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-508. Of course, under the traditional law, title had usually
passed long before delivery.
"1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608. Cf. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69.
0'ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 2-510:5 (1961).
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determined the risk: first, if either party wrongfully caused delivery to be
delayed, and the goods were consequently destroyed, the party at fault bore
the risk;"3 second, if neither party caused a delay, the risk simply followed the
title through the intricacies of rescission and revocation."
A final problem in case of breach is the possible discharge of the seller by
destruction of the specific goods before his performance becomes due. No
Kansas case in point has been found. Occasional cases suggest by their lan-
guage that the seller would not be discharged." Such cases may, however, be
distinguished.0" Certainly the general rule of the common law 7 and the
Sales Act" was that total destruction of the goods voided the sale. The code
continues the rule.6' Such provision results in a partial division of the loss: the
seller loses the value of his bargain plus the cost of performance, while the
buyer loses the value of his bargain (which may occasionally be substantial)."
In case of partial destruction of the goods, the Sales Act gave the buyer a
Hobson's choice-avoid the sale or take the residue at full price." The Uni-
form Commercial Code allows the buyer to avoid the sale, or to take the re-
mainder with due allowance for damage, in full satisfaction of his claim against
the seller. 2 The change in the code apparently resulted from a judgment that
the value of not forcing a new bargain upon the seller is outweighed by the
value of making some reasonable adjustment to the buyer's commercial needs.
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code improves the law of risk of loss in sales
transactions in two ways. First, purely as a matter of technical legal reasoning,
the allocation of risk is well separated from other problems of the sales transac-
tion. Sales problems should not be fungible. Independent consideration of the
incidents of the transaction will enable us more closely to conform our analysis
to our ideas of desirable policy.
Second, as a matter of commercial policy, the code increases the risk borne
by sellers. This also seems sound. The loss from unanticipated destruction of
property is more easily absorbed by society than by the individual. The seller is
usually in a better position either to insure or to establish a pricing policy ade-
quate to distribute losses throughout the industry. Hopefully, minimizing
the likelihood of unabsorbed loss will encourage commercial activity, and
thus benefit society generally.
PATRICK L. BAUDE
'Wing v. Mid-Continent Seeds, Inc., 170 Kan. 242, 225 P.2d 78 (1950); Schenning v. Devere &
Schloegel Lumber Co., 173 Wis. 20, 180 N.W. 136 (1920) (Uniform Sales Act).
' See Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 128 P.2d 665 (1942).
' "It was liable for the breach of the contract although contingencies or circumstances arose which
made it difficult or even beyond its power to perform, circumstances which might have been provided
against when the contract was made." Winfrey v. Galena Auto. Co., 113 Kan. 343, 346, 214 Pac. 781,
782 (1923).
" The promise the defendant was unable to perform in the Winfrey case was one whose impossibility
might have been easily anticipated: he promised to procure the transfer of insurance held by a third person.
' Hastie v. Couturier, 9 Ex. 102, 156 Eng. Rep. 43 (1853).
8 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 7(l).
"UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE S 2-613(a).
" 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1321 (1962).
'UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 7(2). The common law was not defined on this point. See generally 2
WILLISTON, SALEs 1 162 (rev. ed. 1948).
"' UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE 5 2-613(b).
[Vol. 13
